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Explaining, Assessing, and
Changing High Consumption
HARRY VAN DER LINDEN
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These writings reflect the renewed interest in the 1990s of scholars and the
public in questioning the consumer society, an interest that the political crises
engendered by 9/11 have overshadowed but not eliminated. In The Overspent
American, Schor explains the emergence of strong doubts about high
consumption by arguing that a “new consumerism” of escalating desires has
evolved that is increasingly costly to the American high consumers
themselves. In Do Americans Shop Too Much?, she synoptically restates her
view and responds to nine included critical essays. Segal, in Graceful
Simplicity, articulates the virtues of simple living and argues that the main
obstacle to its realization in high-income societies is the growing expense of
satisfying core needs. Confronting Consumption (CC), an anthology of fourteen
papers, discusses the negative impact of consumption on the environment and
contests the prevailing paradigm that environmental degradation is primarily
a matter of production and population. Ethics of Consumption (EC) covers the
prior topics and also raises the issue of how high consumption in the North
affects the global poor. The collection contains twenty-seven essays and is the
culmination of an interdisciplinary project on consumption undertaken by the
Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland.

High Consumption as Status Consumption
In The Overspent American, Schor argues that the “old consumerism” prior to
the 1970s involved neighbors setting the standard of satisfactory spending
and, since neighbors usually have roughly similar incomes, there was no great
pressure to continuously increase spending. What characterizes the “new
consumerism” (coming to its own in the 1980s and beyond) is that many
people have come to identify themselves with individuals who have much
higher incomes, even in the order of five times as much, and seek to emulate
their lifestyles. The harms of this new status or positional consumption are
intense spending pressure, growing material dissatisfaction, less savings,
greater debts, more personal bankruptcies, less preparedness to pay taxes for
public goods, longer working hours, and more two-income families with a
time squeeze.
Schor convincingly shows that positional consumption no longer has
neighbors as a main reference point, but she offers little evidence for her
claim that “by 1991 almost everybody was gazing at the top of the [income]
pyramid” (13). In a survey she conducted about the spending and savings
choices of middle-class employees at a large telecommunications company
(Telecom), only about 2% of the respondents mentioned neighbors as a
reference group, while around 40% mentioned friends or relatives and about
30% referred to coworkers or people with the same occupation (74). Such
reference groups, however, tend to have members with comparatively modest
income variations. Schor disagrees, claiming that “extremely high earners
[have] emerged within occupation after occupation” and have become “a
visible, and very elevated, point of comparison” for the others (10). Her
Telecom survey does not really support her observation. About 60% of the
respondents say that their financial status is the same as that of their
reference group and only about 3% say it is much better or much worse (201).
This does not invalidate Schor’s view that middle-class Americans are
engaged in status spending. Her Telecom study shows that consumers who
view their financial status as below that of their chosen real-life reference
group save significantly less than those who perceive their status to be the
same (76). She also did a survey of cosmetics purchases, showing that the
more a cosmetic is visible to other women in the process of application, the
more is paid for the product irrespective of quality considerations (48-54).

What is debatable, though, is whether Schor is right that during the past few
decades the consumption aspirations of most middle-class Americans have
rapidly grown in reach and intensity. The shift away from neighbors as a
reference group does not warrant her claim. She also maintains that
television—not just advertising but regular programming—creates upscale
desires. How-ever, this can hardly be a major factor because the media have
always projected lifestyles unobtainable for most Americans. In Do Americans
Shop Too Much?, Schor adds that the growing economic inequality since the
1970s has contributed to the new consumerism (9). The huge gain in income
and wealth of the upper-middle class led to a true spending boom visible to all
and influencing almost everyone’s conception of satisfactory spending. No
doubt, Schor has a point here, but the growing economic inequality offers
another explanation for the harms that she associates with the new
consumerism. The globalization of the economy has led to greater job
uncertainty and stagnant or even dropping wages for the majority of
Americans since the early 1970s. At the same time, the costs of satisfying
some basic needs, such as the need for decent housing, have risen in real
terms, partly due to spending patterns of the upper-middle class. These
increased costs have offset much of the increased two-parent household
income from women joining the labor force. Thus we need to assume only a
gradual growth of the consumption expectations of most Americans in order
to explain their growing material dissatisfaction, overworked families,
increased debts, and so on.
High Consumption as Need Satisfaction
This argument finds support in chapter three of Segal’s Graceful Simplicity
(which appeared earlier in EC). He identifies seven core needs—housing,
clothing, food, transportation, health care, education, and protection against
loss of income—and argues that the total income necessary to satisfy the core
needs, i.e., the total “need-required income” (NRI), has risen in real terms in
the United States over the past few decades. The NRI for housing has increased, in some parts of the country outstripping even the real growth of
median two-parent family income. The NRI for transportation has
significantly increased with the emergence of the two-income family in need
of two or more cars. Food and clothing costs have remained more or less
steady, which means that people spent a smaller percentage of their income
on these items. Health care costs have not (yet) increased much as a
percentage of total income because government and business have carried

most of the huge per capita increase. However, the need is unmet for many
Americans. The NRI for education has greatly increased in the areas of day
care and pre-school and the need for these services is often not adequately
met. The NRI for protection against loss of income has grown in recent years
due to decreased job security, longer life span, and greater uncertainty about
the viability of Social Security. Again, the need is often not met. Segal
concludes: “For most Americans their subjective experience—that they
always need more money than they have—is not to be explained by inflation
in their appetites . . . but, rather, by socioeconomic conditions that have
resulted in unmet need or in increased cost of meeting long-existing needs.
This is true of housing, transportation, education, and income security” (6566).
Segal’s analysis offers an important corrective of Schor’s view. However,
where she may be faulted for overstating the escalation of consumption
expectations, he may be faulted for understating them. Segal grants that there
is some escalation of desires (43), but fails to see that part of what he describes as NRI increases in various areas is due to rising consumption
expectations among most middle-class Americans and thus the real NRI
increases are in fact smaller than he portrays them to be. Consider
transportation. Most two-job families may have little choice in buying two
cars, but, certainly, they can opt for a basic economy model or a gas-guzzler
with numerous options. Segal notes that about 20% of the median income
growth for two-parent households between 1960 and 1990 went to increased
transportation costs (56), failing to note that the NRI increase for
transportation would have been smaller if Americans had not opted for
gadgets and powerful engines. The same is true of the NRI for housing, and the
decline of the percentage of total income spent on clothing would have been
even greater without raised expectations.
In Do Americans Shop Too Much?, the critics of Schor offer additional accounts
of what motivates contemporary high spending. Douglas Holt argues, for
example, that we live in a “postmodern market” where people are engaged in
“an open-ended project of self-creation,” a process that leads one “to play with
different identities by consuming the goods and services associated with those
identities” (65). In similar vein, Colin Campbell rejects in EC that contemporary consumption is positional or need-driven; rather, the modern
consumer is a daydreamer, expecting that the purchase of goods will bring
associated pleasures anticipated in the imagination. These alternative

accounts raise interesting questions, such as whether spending motivations
might not vary with age group. Schor discusses social explanations for
increased spending other than status seeking, such as competency signaling.
All these explanations may be needed to complete the picture, but, unlike
increased NRI and the desire to sustain at least middle class status, none of
them seems to go very far in explaining why people remain on the spending
treadmill even when it starts to hurt.
The Functioning/Capabilities Standard of Good Consumption
Schor and most EC contributors evaluate high spending on basis of commonly
accepted values or standards, such as individual happiness and self-respect. A
few EC contributors develop standards rooted in their religious tradition.
Eliezer Diamond offers a Jewish view of consumption, Charles Wilber a Roman
Catholic consumption ethic, and James Nash argues that frugality—“an old
and honored virtue, once near the heart of Christian ethics” (416)—is a
subversive virtue for the affluent society. A final group of essays seeks to
arrive at a more philosophically explicated standard of judging consumption
on the basis of a functioning/capabilities interpretation of human well-being.
In “The Good As Discipline, the Good As Freedom,” Martha Nussbaum
recapitulates her familiar view that there are ten “central human functional
capabilities,” such as the ability to imagine, use practical reason, affiliate with
others, relate to nature, and have good health, adequate food, and shelter.
What is new is that she emphasizes that since the good life requires only the
possession of all capabilities, not their active employment, it would be a grave
mistake of a government to force people toward using specific abilities:
“Capability, not functioning, is our political goal” (321). The mistake is made
by illiberal Aristotelians who view “the good as discipline.” Nussbaum
continues to articulate on the basis of many interesting examples how this
wrong conception differs from her own view of “the good as freedom,” but,
surprisingly, very few of the examples directly concern consumption.
Without contesting Nussbaum’s political point, David Crocker argues that
human flourishing requires that all capabilities be realized in some balance. In
“Living at a High Economic Standard: A Functionings Analysis,” Segal accepts
the drift of this modification and adds that Nussbaum’s account of human
capabilities is not specific enough to articulate the notion of good
consumption. His main concern, however, is to clarify what the relationship is

between income growth and increases in standard of living. On his ac-count, a
high standard of living requires ten actual “core functionings,” consisting of
having meaningful work, enjoying ample time for amusement and company,
living in a pleasant environment, and “core functionings” in the areas of the
seven core needs (outlined above). He concludes that “with respect to
functionings such as devotes ample time to enjoyment of friends or gets
around relatively quickly among the central foci of everyday life or hosts with
pride in a dwelling a reasonable distance from work or lives free from anxiety
over the decline or loss of income or lives in an aesthetically rich human and
natural environment, a case can be made that economic growth has lowered
rather than raised these dimensions of standard of living” (361-62). This is an
important claim and suggests that an explication of human flourishing can
offer a powerful standard of assessing consumption. It should be emphasized,
though, that the issue is not just economic growth, but economic growth in
global corporate capitalism and that there are great differences across classes
in how growth has adversely affected (or improved) good functionings. In
Graceful Simplicity, Segal further explores a high standard of living as graceful
living, stating that it combines material modesty with inner peace, generosity,
and appreciation for others and the world. The exploration is insightful but
does not add much to the critical importance of his ten core functionings
approach.
High Consumption and the Poor
All the books pay remarkably little attention to how upscale spending by the
upper classes specifically affects the desires of the poor in high consumption
societies and increases their NRI in areas such as housing, transportation, and
health care. In “Distancing of Waste: Overconsumption in a Global Economy,”
Jennifer Clapp discusses how the growing waste of producing and discarding
consumer goods is distanced from those who mostly enjoy the goods and ends
up in poor neighborhoods and minority communities (CC, 164). Her main
focus, however, is global distancing and how international efforts to curtail
this practice have had limited success. Her paper supports Thomas Pogge’s
argument in “A Global Resources Dividend” that high consumers in the North
are “negatively responsible” for the “radical poverty” in the developing world.
They consume and trade so that the global status quo—brought about by a
“shared and bloody history” (EC, 509)—is maintained, while alternative global
institutional arrangements are possible that would lessen the poverty.
Moreover, the rich fail to compensate the global poor for their

disproportionate consumption of the earth’s limited resources. Pogge states
that the global poor “cannot secure anything like a proportionate share of the
world’s natural resources [but] they do get their proportionate share of the
burdens resulting from the degradation of our natural environment” (508).
Allen Hammond’s essay in EC comparing resource consumption in the North
and the South supports Pogge’s analysis. The same is true of Richard Tucker’s
essay (in CC) about the U.S. market for tropical products, concluding that “the
cost of . . . prosperity, however far removed from the ultimate consumer, has
been damage and reduction of tropical Nature’s bounty” (195). Pogge offers
his “global resources dividend” (GRD) as a “realistic” and “practicable”
proposal for how the affluent can discharge their responsibility for radical
poverty (511). The GRD is a dividend to be paid for the extraction of limited
resources, such as oil, gas, coal, and various minerals, but may also be
imposed on resources that become “eroded” by industry and agriculture, such
as air and water (511). A modest GRD would generate as much as the total
income of the poorest quintile of the world’s population and is to be
distributed via some international collection agency to the poorest nations in
pro-portion to their populations and for the sake of their economic
development. When poor nations have corrupt governments the GRD is to be
allocated directly to the local poor or to development agencies that represent
their interests (515).
Pogge compares his GRD to the better known “Tobin tax,” which is a tax on
international currency transactions. He grants that the Tobin tax might be
easier to collect and be more acceptable to rich countries, but he rightly notes
that “the Tobin tax has no environmental payoff and also lacks a moral
rationale connecting payers and recipients” (517). The environmental payoff
of the GRD is that it encourages efficient use of resources. This points,
however, to a problem: The GRD inflicts a disproportional burden on
countries with a high and inefficient energy use and a GNP that is a bit too
high to warrant receiving GRD funds. More broadly, Pogge should explore how
his GRD would affect rapidly industrializing nations.
Resource Scarcity
Herman Daly argues in EC that population growth in the South and
consumption in the North will lead to resource scarcity. Mark Sagoff replies in
“Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economics,” claiming that Daly and other

ecological economists “are unable to point to a single scarcity of natural
capital that knowledge and ingenuity are unlikely to alleviate” (EC, 45). Sagoff
concludes that environmentalists should move away from defending the
preservation of the natural world on economic grounds and adopt instead the
approach that nature has great intrinsic value. He writes: “Economic growth
may not be morally desirable even if it is ecologically sustainable” (46).
Sagoff is a technological optimist, holding that technological progress will
always lead to more known and recoverable reserves of nonrenewable
resources as well as to substitutes for resources that have become quite
expensive due to greater scarcity. Dematerialization of production is another
reason for holding that resource scarcity will not impede increased
consumption and economic growth (30ff). Sagoff further claims that tree
plantations and aqua-culture will take care of nature’s limit with regard to
replacing fish and forests (35-36). The editors of CC convincingly challenge
this optimism, noting that even huge increases in estimated supply quickly
disappear once we assume a continuous 5% increase in consumption (9-11).
On their account, high consumption is a greater problem than population
growth as such (and, of course, it is their combination that may in the long run
place much stress on the environment). They also note that consumption may
actually increase as a result of greater technological efficiency. In sum, the
narrow focus on production (and even population) and the failure to question
consumption may actually worsen the problem of resource scarcity. A further
difficulty with Sagoff’s analysis is that the social and political dimensions of
scarcity are neglected. Increased oil consumption, for example, will continue
to create serious political problems in light of the geographical location of
most proven oil reserves, while not all countries will be equally able to bear
the huge costs of moving toward alternative energy sources.
Paul Waggoner and Robert Goodland offer conflicting views in EC of how
agriculture can come to feed a population of 10 billion within the nearby
future. Waggoner argues that since “nature’s salvation lies . . . in humanity
having land to spare,” crop yields must double in the years ahead (71). He
provides few details of how this might be accomplished, but his proposal
seems one of genetic engineering, new pesticides, more use of fertilizer, and
the like. Goodland contests the viability of this strategy of greater intensification, and proposes instead that high consumers, also for the sake of their own
health, eat “lower down the food chain,” ending the situation that almost 50%
of global grains are fed to livestock (101).

Waggoner offers what Jack Manno in CC calls a solution with a “high
commodity potential,” while Goodland’s proposal is much lower on the
commodity potentiality scale. Activities high on the commodity scale require
many marketable products or commodities, while activities with low commodity potential offer few opportunities for the selling and buying of goods.
Walking, for example, has low commodity potential; public transportation
offers medium commodity potential; and personal cars have high commodity
potential (CC, 74). Manno defines commoditization as “the tendency to
preferentially develop things most suited to function as commodities . . . as the
answer to each and every type of human want and need” (70). Industrial
capitalist societies are geared toward commoditization or turning all human
activities into high commodity endeavors. The result is that at present
“improved consumption efficiency—a rise in social and individual welfare
with lower energy and material consumption—is increasingly difficult to
achieve” (73). And the environmental price paid is that approaches are
favored in agriculture, transportation, energy use, and, ironically, even in the
area of environmental protection itself, that cause environmental degradation
and scarcity (83ff). As an alternative to high commodity potential agriculture,
Manno argues for a lower commodity, labor-intensive, diversified, organic
agriculture, offering a critical alternative to Waggoner’s mainstream view.
Changing High Consumption
All the consumption studies here make a strong case for reducing and redirecting high consumption. Current economic growth in high-consumption
societies blocks graceful living, leaves citizens overspent and overworked, and
burdens the natural world. Robert Lane adds that high-consumption societies
have greater rates of depression due the penetration of the market within
social relations (EC, 223ff). Pogge and some other contributors to EC show
that high consumption is implicated in global poverty and exploitation, even
though, surprisingly, none of the authors offers a detailed discussion of
sweatshop labor in for-export-only industries across the developing world.
Schor offers nine “principles” in The Overspent American for getting people off
the “consumer escalator” (145ff). Most of these principles consist of practical
advice as to how individual high consumers can change their life-styles: They
should, for example, control their spending desires, buy durable goods, view
“exclusivity” as “uncool,” avoid shopping as self-reward (“retail therapy”),
share consumer goods, and opt for reduced working hours. Schor sees the

Voluntary Simplicity Movement (VSM) as an indication that American adult
high consumers are ready to take such steps. In his article, “In Search of
Consumption Resistance: The Voluntary Simplicity Movement,” Maniates
offers a sympathetic, yet critical, analysis of VSM, concluding that the
movement is not elitist but is faced with the danger of being co-opted as an
alternative commercial opportunity (“simplicity for sale”). More worrisome,
and not unrelated, is that VSM leaves consumptive resistance mostly a matter
of individual choice and has failed to develop and pursue a political agenda, at
least beyond the local level (CC, 228ff).
Schor recognizes the need for pursuing a political agenda on the national level,
but it is less emphasized than one would expect on basis of the logic of her
own argument: Reducing escalating consumption expectations requires that
the upper-middle class (as reference group) comes to consume less and, in her
own words, this necessitates “reversing thirty years of growing inequality in
the distribution of income and wealth” (164). Her failure to stress the need for
political change might have to do with the fact that The Overspent American is
“directed to people . . . whose incomes afford a comfortable life-style” (xiv). Do
Americans Shop Too Much? is more politically focused. Segal is more
consistent: he rejects “individualistic strategies of simple living” on the ground
that most consumers have in fact little play room for reducing spending as
long as their NRI keeps on rising, and proposes a “politics of simplicity” aimed
at reducing the NRI (87). It includes better public transportation,
free higher education, more federal holidays, and a “simply living credit” to
facilitate the option for reduced working hours for people with modest incomes (84-96).
In “Individualization: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World?,” Maniates is
similarly critical of mainstream environmental groups, such the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), that claim that individuals can save the
earth through making responsible purchases, recycling, tree planting, and, of
course, joining organizations like the EDF. He points out that the irony of this
individualization of responsibility and “flight from politics” is that consumption as “green” consumption legitimizes consumption in general and
with it a major cause of environmental degradation (CC, 65). Individualist
scenarios ignore that consumer choices are limited by institutional practices.
What further undermines the efficacy of such scenarios is that the environmental impact of individual consumption choices is often obscure to those

who make them. Ecocertification and labeling alleviates this problem, but
their effective implementation requires political struggle (see Fred Gale,
“Caveat Certificatum: The Case of Forest Certification,” in CC).
Most of the authors discussed here do not seem to appreciate fully how
difficult it might be to actually change high consumption. Consider again
Manno’s essay on “commoditization.” He distinguishes between three
approaches to taking care of human needs—individual purchase of
commodities, need prevention and reduction, and collective approaches to
need satisfaction—and argues that “a healthy, balanced economy would be
able to steadily improve and develop all three approaches” (CC, 69). Collective
approaches include such practices as sharing resources, public transportation,
and communal entertainment, while need reduction and prevention include
such measures as shortening the distance between home and work, health
promotions, and eliminating excessive ways of satisfying basic needs. Schor,
Segal, and all the other high consumption critics here argue for expanding one
or both of these two approaches, but, as Manno notes, in capitalist society, due
its very nature, the road taken is primarily one of expanding personal
consumption; it is the road with the highest commodity potential. So, minimally, the challenge of changing high consumption requires the emergence of
the political will to reverse the privatization of public services and the market
penetration of all aspects of society. This means that democracy and political
involvement must be much strengthened on local and national levels and
become independent of corporate influence. This point, to the extent that it is
at all recognized, remains understated, even in Manno’s essay. More radically,
and beyond the horizon of the literature examined here, successful
consumptive resistance might necessitate that alternatives to corporate
capitalism, such as economic democracy, are articulated and realized.
What adds to the challenge of the political project of changing high
consumption is that neoliberal economic globalization has weakened political
democracy and is pushing its agenda of unrestricted market rationality across
the world. Here it should be noted that Pogge’s GRD, even if it would eradicate
the worst and most devastating expressions of global poverty, basically leaves
the question open of how sustainable, responsible, and satisfactory
consumption can be realized for most of humanity not residing in the North.
Global labor and environmental standards as well as global regulatory rules
about investment, supporting local autonomy, might be steps in the right
direction. More broadly, it is crucial that high commodity strategies cease to

be the dominant paradigm of economic development in the South because
they lead to growing economic inequality (within and between states) and
might bring about serious or even devastating environmental harms. Again,
low commodity approaches require public empowerment and the curtailment
of global corporate dominance, if not the realization of a different economy
altogether. These are formidable political tasks, but the recent antiglobalization movement offers some hope that the challenge of changing high
consumption will be eventually met.

